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The United States has been coping with a new phenomenon since 
2002: a South Korea that can say “no” to America. Along with Japan and the 
Philippines, South Korea used to be one of the staunchest U.S. allies in Asia. 
From 1950 to 1953, 54,000 Americans lost their lives to defend South Korea 
from North Korean and Chinese Communist forces. The United States has 
since poured more than $13 billion in economic aid and military assistance 
into the country, and it still maintains approximately 29,500 troops there. Yet, 
despite these past and present contributions to its security and modernization, 
more and more Americans feel that South Korea no longer appreciates their 
efforts and is growing ungrateful, uncooperative, and in some cases downright 
hostile. A bipartisan consensus appears to be developing in the United States 
on this point. Troubled by the spread of anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea, 
Senator Hillary Clinton (D-N.Y.) lamented that South Korea is suffering from 
“historical amnesia.”1
Americans experienced a full dose of this new reality in 2002. In June of 
that year, a U.S. armored vehicle accidentally killed two South Korean mid-
dle-school girls. When the driver and navigator of the vehicle were acquitted 
despite their conflicting statements in a U.S. court marshal, hundreds of thou-
sands of South Koreans took to the streets. Ordinary citizens joined candle-
light vigils to protest the injustice of the verdict, and some students even 
burned U.S. flags to express their outrage. In a break with the past, South 
Koreans were no longer willing to give U.S. military personnel a free pass for 
the sake of national security.
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Anti-Americanism is not a new phenomenon in South Korea. In fact, it 
constituted one of the strongest undercurrents of the intense and protracted 
pro-democracy movement of the 1980s. When Chun Doo-hwan’s military 
regime brutally suppressed a pro-democracy movement in Kwangju in May 
1980, many South Koreans suspected that Washington was behind Chun’s 
actions.2 The decade was marked by intermittent eruptions of high-profile 
demonstrations and protests against U.S. sup-
port of Chun’s dictatorship, such as the arson at 
the U.S. Cultural Center in Pusan in 1982 and 
the occupation of the U.S. Cultural Center in 
Seoul in 1985.3
Given the appeal of American popular cul-
ture and general respect for the ideals of the 
U.S. political and economic system in South 
Korea, however, rising South Korean anti-Ameri-
canism certainly does not mean rejecting every-
thing associated with the United States. It can 
be more accurately described as frustration and anger at Washington for gen-
eral disrespect and certain specific U.S. policies, particularly toward North 
Korea.4 Conspicuous in the current upsurge of anti-U.S. sentiment in South 
Korea, however, is that it is not limited to a radical fringe of the dissident 
movement. It appears to be becoming ubiquitous, in civil society, academia, 
and even in the government.
The presidential campaign of Roh Moo-hyun, a relatively young human 
rights lawyer who had never visited the United States prior to his election in 
December 2002, benefited substantially from the high tide of anti-U.S. senti-
ment in South Korea. His election is both a significant result and an example 
of a more self-confident, occasionally anti-U.S. South Korea. This transition 
is the result of several important changes in South Korea’s economy, politics, 
and external relations during the past few decades. Some, particularly in the 
United States, may fear that South Korea has become anti-U.S. and is stra-
tegically shifting toward China. Such a conclusion confuses the symptoms of 
changes in South Korea for their causes. Instead, a combination of South Ko-
rean economic development over time, the rise of a new generation in South 
Korean politics, and changing inter-Korean relations help explain a Seoul that 
has become more fundamentally independent than anti-U.S. or pro-Chinese.
Economic Development Creates a New Context
South Korea’s remarkable economic development since 1960, by reducing 
Seoul’s dependence on the United States, has provided the background for a 
The younger 386 
generation feels far 
more ambivalent 
toward the United 
States.
THE WASHINGTON QUARTERLY ■ SPRING 2007
How to Deal with South Korea l
73
reexamination of its traditional patron-client relationship with Washington 
and has expanded the range of choices for broader foreign policy decisions.
When a student demonstration brought down the corrupt Rhee govern-
ment in April 1960, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the 
world. Its 1960 gross domestic product per capita was lower than that of some 
sub-Saharan African and most Latin American countries, as well as many of 
its Asian neighbors.5 Although South Koreans appreciated U.S. aid at the 
time, many were aware that Seoul’s aid dependence carried significant costs. 
When Washington used its aid leverage to force South Korea’s military gov-
ernment to scrap its initial economic development plan in 1962 and to honor 
its commitment to restoring an elected regime by the next year, Park Chung-
hee and his followers adopted an aggressive export-led industrialization strat-
egy to prevent such vulnerability in the future.6
As a result of the above strategy, South Korea averaged an annual growth 
rate of eight percent over the subsequent decades and joined the Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development in 1994. South Korea is now the 
world’s twelfth-largest economy and holds the fourth-largest foreign reserves. 
It is one of the top five producers in the world of ships, automobiles, electron-
ics, and steel. Seoul’s new status as an economic middle power has enabled it 
to take an active role in regional cooperation in East Asia as well as in multi-
lateral trade negotiations. It is the seventh-largest U.S. trading partner, ahead 
of such European countries as France and Italy, enabling it to deal with the 
United States on more equal terms.
Although South Korea has rather consistently grown economically since 
the 1960s, South Korea’s perception of the United States has not suffered a 
continuous decline over the same period. Anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea 
seems to have reached a peak in the mid-1980s, after which it began to de-
cline, before recording another peak in recent years. There is thus no direct 
causal relationship between South Korea’s economic position and its attitude 
toward the United States. The fluctuations are based more on specific inci-
dents resulting from changes in political leadership and policy preferences.
The New Elites Break with Tradition
South Korea’s growing self-assertiveness is also a product of its self-induced 
democratization. Along with some formerly Communist countries in eastern 
Europe, South Korea democratized from the bottom up via social movements.7 
Students who led the movement against the Rhee regime in April 1960 were 
later joined by industrial workers, intellectuals, and religious leaders in the 
1970s in their campaign against Park’s dictatorship. Later, the triple solidarity 
of students, workers, and religious leaders expanded even further to include 
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middle-class citizens in the democracy uprising of June 1987.8 South Korea’s 
democratic transition in 1987 was in large part the fruit of these persistent 
pro-democracy struggles by social movement activists and opposition politi-
cians throughout the 1970s and 1980s.
The “386 Generation”—South Koreas who were in their 30s, who went 
to universities in the 1980s, and who were born in the 1960s—emerged as a 
driving force in South Korean politics during 
the 1990s, being well equipped with excellent 
organizational and leadership skills acquired 
during the intense pro-democracy struggles of 
the 1980s. Many former movement organiz-
ers have also successfully entered the politi-
cal arena as legislators, party leaders, lawyers, 
judges, policymakers, and government ofﬁcials. 
The proportion of 386 Generation politicians 
among the members elected to the National 
Assembly sharply increased from 24.3 percent 
in 1996 to 32.9 percent in 2000 to 45.9 percent in 2004.9 Their movement 
into the political establishment helps to explain why anti-U.S. sentiment in 
South Korea today is more extensive and powerful.
These new South Korean politicians and policymakers do not agree with 
their parents’ and grandparents’ views of the United States. To older genera-
tions, the United States was a savior, rescuing South Korea from a possible 
Communist takeover during the Korean War and from abject poverty in the 
1950s. Their general attitude was one of profound gratitude and unwavering 
loyalty. In contrast, the 386 Generation and their younger cohorts feel far 
more ambivalent toward the United States. Younger South Koreans never ex-
perienced the devastation of war and abject poverty of the 1950s, and they do 
not see the United States as a savior. Many of them risked their lives fighting 
authoritarian regimes and are understandably proud of their country’s eco-
nomic development and democratization.
They do acknowledge that Washington supported South Korea’s democra-
tization on a number of occasions.10 The Rhee regime would have never been 
overthrown without the withdrawal of U.S. support in 1960. Washington in-
tervened to save the life of Kim Dae-jung, a prominent opposition leader and 
democracy activist, from the murderous Korean Central Intelligence Agency 
in the mid-1970s. The United States also helped South Korea’s pro-democ-
racy movement during the 1970s via various civil society assistance programs 
for religious organizations and human rights groups. Most of all, the United 
States played a vital, although rather belated, role in promoting South Korea’s 
1987 democratization by dispatching government officials and making public 
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statements to warn the Chun government against another military coup and 
to push for a democratic transition.
Young South Koreans can also point, however, to several examples of U.S. 
duplicity. Park’s military coup in 1961, which toppled the democratically elect-
ed government of Chang Myon, was rewarded and legitimized by President 
John F. Kennedy’s warm welcome of Park during his official trip to the United 
States in November 1961. Throughout the early 1980s, when many 386 Gen-
eration youths risked their lives to fight for democracy, Washington largely 
remained silent. Most critically, because the commander in chief of the Re-
public of Korea–U.S. Combined Forces Command held operational control of 
the South Korean Army, many South Koreans argue that Chun’s brutal sup-
pression of the pro-democracy movement in Kwangju in May 1980 would not 
have been possible without the United States’ implicit endorsement or active 
support. In February 1981, after Chun’s suppression of the democracy move-
ment and subsequent takeover of power, President Ronald Reagan welcomed 
Chun to the White House as his second foreign guest since being inaugurated. 
Looking back, this condoning of a violent dictatorship stands in stark contrast 
to the harsh U.S. condemnation of the Chinese government after the 1989 
Tiananmen massacre.
The current anti-U.S. sentiment in South Korea is thus a function of young 
South Koreans’ perception of the ambiguous U.S. role in the checkered history 
of South Korean democratization. Whenever young South Koreans see the 
United States, particularly the current Bush administration, carrying the torch 
of democracy promotion around the globe, they cannot help but recall the 
contradictory U.S. role in South Korea and be suspicious of Washington’s mo-
tives. They question the traditional patron-client relationship that has been 
the status quo since the 1950s.
For the next several decades, this new breed of progressive-minded South 
Koreans will constitute a sizable portion of the adult population. South Kore-
ans born after 1960 accounted for 64.3 percent of the South Korean popula-
tion in 2000. According to a Korea Society Opinion Institute public survey 
conducted in November 2006, 68.9 percent of those in their 20s deﬁned them-
selves as “progressive,” greatly exceeding the national average of progressives 
of 44.6 percent in all age groups.11
Inter-Korean Rapprochement Changes the Equation
The last cause for South Korea’s increased self-assertiveness vis-à-vis the 
United States is the substantially changed relationship between North and 
South Korea. The competition between the systems of the capitalist South 
and Communist North during the 1960s and 1970s fell apart as North Korea 
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slowly degenerated into an economic disaster in the 1980s.12 The virtual end 
of the competition with North Korea has had significant psychological effects 
on South Koreans.
Most importantly, the anti-Communist, that is, anti–North Korean, pro-
paganda that maintained a sense of emergency and repressed pro-democracy 
movements during the Park and Chun authoritarian regimes no longer proves 
persuasive. Meanwhile, the withering of the North weakens the argument that 
South Korea needs to maintain positive relations with a strong patron such as 
the United States to deter an aggressive North. Finally, the horrific images of 
undernourished children during the North Korean famine of the late 1990s 
have had a significant impact on the South Korean psyche, undermining the 
traditional image of North Korea as a belligerent neighbor ready to attack 
South Korea at any moment.
At the same time, economic and social ties between the North and South 
are growing stronger. Since the historic summit between then-President Kim 
Dae-jung and Chairman Kim Jong-il in June 2000, there have been a series 
of successful collaborative projects between the South and the North. Rail-
roads are being connected, and as a result, an increasing number of South 
Koreans are visiting North Korean tourist attractions. In 2005 alone, more 
than 300,000 South Korean tourists visited Mt. Kumgang, which operated at 
a deficit for years due to overly optimistic initial business plans. At the Kae-
song Industrial Complex, just north of the demilitarized zone, South Korean 
companies employ more than 10,000 North Korean workers to make clothes, 
shoes, and many other products for the countries’ mutual benefit. It would be 
an exaggeration, however, to claim that South Korea no longer regards North 
Korea as a threat. Although they see North Korea as a needy neighbor, South 
Koreans do not dispute that it is also a potential troublemaker that can wreak 
havoc on the Korean peninsula and around the globe.
The question of how to deal with North Korea, however, has caused a sig-
nificant amount of friction with the United States, especially since the Bush 
administration took over the White House in 2001. The crux of the disagree-
ment is that some of the U.S. options for dealing with Pyongyang are un-
thinkable for South Korea, primarily because of its geographical proximity 
to North Korea and also because of South Koreans’ changing perceptions of 
their brethren to the north. Military options, which could potentially escalate 
into nuclear war, could annihilate the entire peninsula. The massive refugee 
flood, regional insecurity, and potentially irreversible economic downturn that 
regime collapse or change could cause could easily nullify the economic pros-
perity and political freedom that South Koreans have achieved over the past 
60 years. To avoid such nightmarish scenarios, many South Koreans argue that 
North Korea must be consistently engaged and carefully managed.
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From 1998 to 2000, the United States and South Korea developed an ef-
fective division of labor in dealing with North Korea, by which the United 
States would contain North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs through 
direct negotiations while South Korea would promote internal changes in 
North Korea through economic engagement. The United States also reached 
an understanding with North Korea to secure better access in South Korea 
as U.S.–North Korean relations improved, as 
encapsulated in the U.S.–North Korean joint 
communiqué of October 2000. Through this 
more-for-more approach, the United States 
sought to resolve suspicions about North Ko-
rea’s “hole in the ground” at Kumchangri, the 
underground site at which it was suspected 
North Korea might be building nuclear facili-
ties, and its incipient uranium-enrichment 
program. The Bush administration abandoned 
this approach in 2001 and called North Korea 
part of the “axis of evil” in January 2002. South Korean political leaders have 
subsequently become much more outspoken about their disagreements and 
displeasure with U.S. policies in general, but particularly on how to resolve the 
North Korean crisis.
In an address to the World Affairs Council of Los Angeles in November 
2004, President Roh unequivocally stated that South Korea would be op-
posed to policies of military attack, containment, or regime change toward 
North Korea, even though Washington had made it clear that these options 
remained on the table.13 To encourage North Korea to return to the six-party 
talks in June 2005, South Korean foreign minister Ban Ki-moon asked U.S. of-
ficials to refrain from making provocative remarks about North Korea, such as 
calling it an “outpost of tyranny,” as Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice did 
during her 2005 confirmation hearings.14
Even North Korea’s nuclear test on October 9, 2006, did not change South 
Korea’s stance. South Koreans initially expressed anger at the Kim Jong-il re-
gime for escalating tensions, but many soon redirected their frustration toward 
the Bush administration for refusing to engage in serious negotiations with 
North Korea. In fact, when asked by polling companies a few days after North 
Korea’s nuclear test who bears the greatest responsibility for the nuclear crisis, 
South Koreans blamed the United States as much as they did North Korea. 
Their changed perceptions of their relationship with the North, because of 
North Korea’s economic decline and inter-Korean rapprochement, make it in-
creasingly difficult for South Koreans to understand Washington’s use of hard-
line rhetoric and policy on this issue. Moreover, in a poll conducted one week 
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after the 2006 nuclear test, 62 percent of respondents were in favor of con-
tinuing inter-Korean economic cooperation projects.15 They believe that these 
projects offer the best hope for promoting internal change in North Korea.
South Koreans find it difficult to understand why its longtime ally does not 
respect their changed perceptions, preferences, and interests, instead pursuing 
options that they deem unacceptable. Moreover, coupled with their recollec-
tion of the confusing U.S. role in their country’s democratization, South Kore-
ans’ current disappointment with Washington could develop into a suspicion 
that the United States might play an equally equivocal role in building peace 
and accomplishing reunification of the Korean peninsula.
The China Factor: Not a Simple Story
At the same time, the relative importance of the United States to South Korea 
has been steadily declining with the rise of China, at least in economic terms. 
China has made impressive economic and geopolitical gains with South Korea 
since their normalization of relations in 1992. Before normalization, China 
bought only 1.4 percent of South Korea’s exports in 1991 while the United 
States bought 25.8 percent. By 2003, however, China’s share of South Korea’s 
exports had increased to 18.1 percent while the U.S. share had declined to 17.7 
percent. Although the United States remains one of South Korea’s most impor-
tant trade and business partners, the growth in China’s relative importance is 
unmistakable. To beneﬁt from China’s spectacular economic growth and create 
a geopolitical environment conducive to peace and security in Northeast Asia, 
South Korea wants to maintain a close relationship with China.
Beijing and Seoul do cooperate closely in dealing with Pyongyang and 
Washington through the six-party talks. At the same time, however, South 
Korea has a strong incentive to hedge against a nonpeaceful rise of China and 
harbors strategic anxiety regarding China’s growing influence on North Korea. 
There is a growing concern in South Korea that North Korea could become a 
de facto Chinese province if Beijing’s economic and geopolitical influence on 
Pyongyang continues to increase.16
Because of the trends in South Korean–Chinese relations in recent years, 
some U.S. policymakers and scholars have overlooked these South Korean 
concerns, instead concluding that Seoul has become “a runaway ally full of 
appeasers” increasingly aligned with China.17 According to these scholars, 
South Korea’s anti-Americanism is indicative of a more fundamental shift in 
its allegiance from the United States to China. These concerns are overblown. 
The emergence of a confident and self-assertive South Korea implies more in-
dependent thinking in South Korea’s foreign policy, not a shift to China at the 
United States’ expense.
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The controversy over the true ownership of the ancient kingdom of Kogu-
ryo in 2004 provides a clear example of how South Korea reacts when China 
is perceived to be overreaching on historical and geopolitical matters. In April 
2004, the Chinese Foreign Ministry deleted references to Koguryo from the 
Korea country profile on its Web site. The Chinese government–sponsored 
Northeast Project of the Chinese Academy 
of Social Sciences claimed that Koguryo was 
a Chinese vassal state, or regional province. 
When South Korea protested, China respond-
ed by deleting the entire pre–World War II 
history of Korea. With North Korea becom-
ing increasingly dependent on China, some 
South Koreans interpreted the Chinese ac-
tion as laying the historical foundation to ex-
pand its influence into the Korean peninsula. 
Given China’s efforts to present itself as a benign and nonhegemonic power 
under the “peaceful rise” slogan, its handling of the delicate Koguryo issue 
came as a surprise to many Koreans.
South Korea aims to support China’s peaceful development and to prevent a 
U.S.-Chinese confrontation, which would likely have a very negative effect on 
the Korean peninsula. South Korean ambivalence toward China is not very dif-
ferent from the sentiment of the policy of “congagement,” the combination of 
containment and engagement toward China promoted by some U.S. policymakers.18 
Although more hawkish U.S. policymakers may prefer the formation of an anti-
Chinese bloc linking India, Vietnam, Taiwan, and Japan with the United States, 
the current mainstream view in Washington is consistent with Seoul’s approach, 
placing greater emphasis on engagement than containment, avoiding the self-ful-
ﬁlling prophesy of confrontation with China, and facilitating China’s transition to 
becoming a responsible stakeholder in the international community.
An Independent Seoul
Given its economic development, political transition, and bilateral relations 
with North Korea, a confident and self-assertive South Korea is neither a 
“rebel without a cause” nor a fleeting phenomenon. Rather, South Korea’s 
attitudinal shift has multiple causes and will endure through several future 
administrations. Faced with this newly assertive South Korea and the larger 
challenges of dealing with China and crafting a new regional order, Washing-
ton has two options.19
One is to ignore South Korea’s transformation and try to maintain the tra-
ditional patron-client relationship within the hub-and-spoke alliance against 
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China, using the North Korean nuclear crisis as a catalyst. This policy, how-
ever, is likely to find little support in South Korea and may incite a nationalist 
backlash if the United States is increasingly viewed as an impediment to Ko-
rean reunification and regional security. It would also increase the possibility 
of a “Korea shift,” i.e., South Korea moving closer to China and further away 
from the United States, and exacerbate a continental-maritime division in 
Northeast Asia.
Even if the U.S. objective were to contain China, its hard-line policy toward 
North Korea would likely be counterproductive, only helping China to expand 
its influence on the Korean peninsula. The United States would find itself 
increasingly tied to Japan, whose reluctance to come to terms with its past 
has limited the effectiveness of its diplomacy. Under this strategic approach, 
Washington essentially risks sacrificing the Korean peninsula to cement its 
relationship with Japan and contain China.
The alternative is to engage South Korea on equal terms as a means of 
managing China’s gradual transition and resolving the North Korean nuclear 
crisis. This policy would require the United States to position itself as equidis-
tant between China and Japan, consistently signaling to Beijing that the exist-
ing U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea are not designed to threaten it. 
At the same time, Washington would have to reassure Tokyo that this policy is 
not meant to avoid engaging Japan. The United States would play the role of 
a stabilizer in Northeast Asia, strengthening the U.S. position on the Korean 
peninsula while improving its options in dealing with China and Japan. It 
would also have the effect of encouraging Japan to improve its relations with 
its neighbors. Under this approach, South Korea would be an advocate for and 
a partner in promoting regional cooperation.
With a prosperous market economy, liberal democratic polity, and good 
relations with its neighbors, South Korea is a prime example of the importance 
and success of U.S. assistance and support in building democracies and estab-
lishing market economies in Asia. Rather than being bewildered by a “rebel-
lious” South Korea, viewing its newfound strength as a puzzle and a threat, 
Washington should feel proud of the contributions it made to South Korea’s 
economic and political development and respect South Korea as a grown-up 
ally to consult while evaluating its policies toward North Korea, Northeast 
Asia, and beyond.
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